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COMMENT 
TOWARD A FUTURE OF 
ENFORCEMENT: 
A CRITIQUE OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT'S INVALIDATION OF 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are searching for a job. As you scan for 
job listings in the morning paper, you notice an article about 
the monthly employment report issued by the United States 
Department of Labor.l The report reveals that nine million 
American workers are unemployed, just like you.2 Of the nine 
million jobless workers, just over two million reported that they 
have been searching for work for six months or longer.3 The 
article also points out that workers who remain unemployed for 
extended periods of time tend to accept positions that pay less 
1 See, e.g., MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, NovemberlDecember, 2003, at 93, Table 4, 
available at http://stats.bls.gov/news.releaselempsittOI.htm (last visited March 5, 2004). 
2 For example, the unemployment rate for the month of September 2003 was 
6.1%, which correlates to approximately nine million Americans without jobs. Id. 
3 Of the nine million persons unemployed as of September 2003, 2.1 million 
reported that they had been looking for work for 27 weeks or longer. Id. at 95, Table 7, 
available at http://stats.bls.gov/news.releaselempsitt09.htm (last visited March 5, 2004). 
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than previously held positions.4 You understand; you have not 
received a paycheck in six months. 
Later that same day, you are offered a job that pays a sal-
ary higher than you have ever earned. There is only one condi-
tion: before you may accept the employer's offer, you must sign 
a mandatory arbitration agreement. The agreement requires 
you to arbitrate future workplace disputes instead of bringing 
your claims in court. The employer explains that the agree-
ment covers any claims that may arise out of your employment 
relationship, including violations of your civil rights. Would 
you sign the arbitration agreement to secure the job? Or would 
you reject a steady paycheck to preserve the right to your day 
in court? 
On the eve of a recession that left nine million American 
workers jobless,s the United States Supreme Court held that 
the Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter "FAA") applies to em-
ployment contracts.S To the American worker, this means that 
under the FAA, employers may require prospective employees 
to sign agreements to arbitrate disputes that arise out of the 
employment relationship, including state and federal statutory 
claims of employment discrimination.7 Of course, employers 
offer applicants a choice: arbitrate, or return to the want ads.s 
4 Jon E. Hilsenrath, 'Jobless'Recovery Feels a Lot Like a Recession, WALL ST. J. 
ONLINE (October 3, 2003), at http://www.careeljoumaLcom/salaryhiringlhotissues/200306IO-
hilsenrath.html (last visited March 5, 2004). 
5 The current recession began in March 2001. Id. 
6 The U.S. Supreme Court decided Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 
(2001) on March 21, 2001, on the eve of the current recession. See id. The FAA refers 
to the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213 §1, 43 Stat. 883. The FAA was reen-
acted in 1947 as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947). Current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). 
7 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 119 (holding the FAA governs the 
arbitration clauses in a Circuit City job application, which the prospective employee 
was required to execute before being considered for employment). 
8 Arbitration is a process by which a dispute is submitted to one or more impar-
tial persons, called arbitrators, for a final and binding decision. American Arbitration 
Ass'n, AAA Glossary of Dispute Resolution Terms, available at 
http://www.adr.orglindex2.I.jsp?JSPssid=IS784 (last visited February 23, 2004). 
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When the arbitration agreement is contained in a take-it-or-
leave-it employment contract, however, the decision to "take it" 
will rarely be truly voluntary, particularly when jobs are diffi-
cult to obtain.9 
This Comment focuses on mandatory pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements that prospective employees must sign in order 
to be hired, or even considered, for a given position. Growing 
numbers of employers are implementing mandatory arbitration 
programs to resolve workplace disputes in response to recent 
case law upholding the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments. IO Employers may present arbitration agreements in 
employment contracts, employment handbooks, or in job appli-
cations. ll This Comment posits that while arbitration is an 
efficient method of adjudicating many claims, mandatory arbi-
tration agreements in employment contracts are potentially 
unfair to employees for three reasons. These three concerns 
arise because employers typically control the terms on which 
most employees are hired.12 
The first concern arises where employers require employ-
ees to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employ-
ment. This means that if the applicant wants to accept an em-
ployer's job offer, then she must also accept the arbitration 
9 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. 
L. REV. 33, 131 (1997) ("unless the adherent has a meaningful opportunity to bargain 
or shop [the arbitration] term, she may feel compelled to accept it .... "). 
10 G. Roger King and Rob Edmund, Mandatory Employment Arbitration Agree· 
ments: As More Employers Weigh Their Costs and Benefits, Courts Remain Divided 
Over Enforceability of Key Provisions, 9 No. 4 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL PRACTICE AND 
GUIDANCE 6, July/August 2003. For case law encouraging employers to implement 
mandatory arbitration programs, see, for example, Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(2001) (upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the employment con-
text). 
11 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Notice Number 
915.002, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimi-
nation Disputes as a Condition of Employment (July 10, 1997), at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docslmandarb.html(last visited March 5, 2004) !hereinafter 
EEOC Notice]. 
12 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 
115 (2000) ("in the case of preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic pressure 
exerted by employers on all but the most sought after employees may be particularly 
acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary em-
ployment .... "). 
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agreement on the employer's terms. Because most employees 
lack the bargaining power to negotiate or reject unfavorable 
terms, such agreements may be considered procedurally uncon-
scionable. 13 Second, in operation, arbitration agreements often 
compel only employees to give up the right to bring future 
claims in court because employers are unlikely to initiate typi-
cal employment-related suits against employees.14 Such 
agreements are unfairly one-sided.15 Finally, employers who 
enjoy superior bargaining power may impose arbitration provi-
sions that restrict employees' statutory rights. Such provisions 
may be considered substantively unconscionable. 16 To illus-
trate how these fairness concerns affect employees, this Com-
ment sets forth the approaches taken by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court in assess-
ing the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements in 
employment contracts.17 
In Part I,18 this Comment provides the backdrop against 
which the United States Supreme Court decided Circuit City v. 
Adams II (hereinafter "Adams IF') , a landmark decision up-
holding the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the em-
13 Under California law, unconscionability refers to "an absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unrea· 
sonably favorable to the other party." A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 
3d 473, 486 (1982). The defmition of unconscionability implicates two distinct aspects 
of unconscionability: procedural and substantive. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114. 
Procedural unconscionability focuses on the process of contract formation, and the 
extent to which the stronger party used its superior bargaining position to oppress the 
weaker party. [d. Substantive unconscionability focuses on whether the terms of the 
contract produce "overly harsh" or "one-sided" results. [d. A contract is unenforceable 
under California law if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, 
though the elements need not be present to the same degree. [d. For examples of cases 
finding arbitration agreements procedurally unconscionable, see Armendariz, 24 Cal. 
4'" at 114-115; Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9 th Cir. 2002); Circuit City v. 
Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9 th Cir. 2003); Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 
(9 th Cir. 2003). Cf Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002); Circuit 
City v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1106, 1108, n.2 (9'" Cir. 2002) (finding no showing of procedural 
unconscionability where employees had the opportunity to opt out of the arbitration 
program). 
14 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003). 
15 See id. 
16 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 90. See supra note 13 for a definition of 
substantive unconscionability. 
17 See infra notes 154-229 and accompanying text for discussion of Ninth Circuit 
cases. See infra notes 230-278 and accompanying text for discussion of the California 
Supreme Court case, Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4'" 83. 
18 See infra notes 23-153 and accompanying text. 
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ployment context.19 Part II examines Ninth Circuit decisions in 
the aftermath of Adams II, which applied the doctrine of un-
conscionability under California contract law to invalidate com-
pulsory arbitration agreements, in spite of the pro-arbitration 
mandate of Adams II.20 Part III considers the California Su-
preme Court's approach to assessing unconscionability in the 
employment arbitration case, Armendariz u. Foundation 
Health Psychcare Seruices.2i Part IV compares the two ap-
proaches, and recommends changes to the Ninth Circuit's cur-
rent approach to assessing unconscionability claims.22 Last, 
Part V concludes that the Ninth Circuit should adopt the rec-
ommended approaches in order to balance the preservation of 
employees' rights with a policy encouraging voluntary arbitra-
tion as an effective method of resolving employment disputes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACTS IMPLICATE COMPETING FEDERAL CONCERNS: 
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND TITLE VII 
Mandatory arbitration agreements in employment con-
tracts often implicate two federal policies that affect employ-
ment relationships.23 On one hand, the FAA represents a fed-
eral policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments.24 On the other hand, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (hereinafter "Title VII") prohibits employment discrimina-
19 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). In the main text, this Comme~t 
refers to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(2001), as Adams II. In Adams II, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), referred to herein as 
Adams I. Following its decision in Adams II, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the 
case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent its opinion. This Comment 
refers to the remand, Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002), as Adams Ill. 
20 See infra notes 154-229 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 230-278 and accompanying text. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th 83 
(2000). 
22 See infra notes 279-344 and accompanying text. 
23 See, generally, King and Edmund, supra note 10 (stating that the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision in Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), confirmed that 
arbitration agreements between employees and employers are enforceable under the 
FAA, and reaffirmed that employees can be required to arbitrate employment disputes, 
including statutory discrimination claims under Title VII ). 
24 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). 
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tion and gives victims of workplace discrimination the right to 
sue offending employers in federal COurt.25 Mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements create tension between these two federal poli-
cies by requiring employees to arbitrate, rather than litigate, 
their Title VII claims.26 The tension between the FAA and Title 
VII is exacerbated by concerns that arbitration procedures do 
not allow employees to fully vindicate the civil rights that Title 
VII protects.27 Any attempt to reconcile the FAA's policy favor-
ing arbitration with the protection of employees' Title VII 
rights, however, must also account for the advantages that em-
ployees gain by arbitrating employment disputes.28 
1. The FAA's Pro-Arbitration Mandate 
Employers that require employees sign mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements as part of the hiring process 
may rely on the FAA to enforce employees' obligations to arbi-
trate employment-related claims.29 Prior to the enactment of 
the FAA, judges frequently refused to enforce arbitration 
agreements because such agreements deprived the courts of 
jurisdiction.30 In 1925, Congress passed the FAA to quell "judi-
cial hostility" to arbitration and to ensure that courts would 
enforce private arbitration agreements.31 In addition, Congress 
hoped to encourage arbitration as an alternative to trial in or-
25 Title VII, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (unlawful employment practices); id. § 2000e-5 (O(1)(A) (2000) 
(civil action by person aggrieved). 
26 See, e.g., EEOC Notice, supra note 11. ("The imposition of mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements as a condition of employment substitutes a private dispute resolution 
system for the public justice system intended by Congress to govern the enforcement of 
the employment discrimination laws."). 
27 See id. (taking the position that agreements requiring employees to arbitrate 
workplace discrimination claims as a condition of employment are contrary to the prin-
ciples embodied in these civil rights laws). 
28 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 122-123 (endorsing the "real bene-
fits" of enforcing arbitration agreements in the employment context). 
29 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 119 (holding that the FAA applies 
to arbitration agreements in employment contracts). 
30 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 (1985) (referring to 
the House Report accompanying the FAA, H.R. REp. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924». 
31 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean 
Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 219-220 n.6). 
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der to ease the burdens of crowded court dockets and high liti-
gation costS.32 
To accomplish its goals, the FAA makes arbitration 
agreements as enforceable as other contracts.33 Section 2 of the 
FAA provides in part: 
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such con-
tract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.34 
In addition to requiring courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements to the same extent as any other contract, the FAA 
also provides a remedy to bring about enforcement.35 If an em-
ployee who is a party to a valid arbitration agreement refuses 
to arbitrate her claims, § 4 of the FAA authorizes the employer-
party to request an order compelling arbitration from a United 
States district court.36 Similarly, if an employee opposing arbi-
tration ignores the arbitration agreement and files her claims 
in court, § 3 of the FAA allows her employer to ask the court to 
delay trial proceedings pending arbitration of any claims cov-
ered by the agreement.37 Doubts as to whether an agreement 
covers specific claims are to be resolved by courts in favor of 
arbitration.38 
32 Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 220 (referring to the House Report accom-
panying the Federal Arbitration Act, H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924». 
33 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n.12 (1967). 
34 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added). 
35 Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 220 n.6. 
36 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) ("A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or re-
fusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition 
any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdic-
tion under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit aris-
ing out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitra-
tion proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement."). 
37 [d. § 3 ("If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United 
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue 
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, 
shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitra-
tion has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the appli-
cant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration."). 
38 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). 
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In addition to overcoming judicial hostility to arbitration in 
the federal courts, Congress enacted the . FAA to supplement 
state arbitration statutes.39 The existing state statutes pro-
vided arbitration procedures but did not require state courts to 
enforce private arbitration contracts.40 To fill in the gaps in 
these statutes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA re-
quires state courts as well as federal courts to enforce arbitra-
tion clauses.41 Accordingly, the FAA governs all claims covered 
by the arbitration agreement, whether based on federal or state 
law.42 The U.S. Supreme Court further held that Congress pre-
cluded the states from requiring a judicial forum for claims 
that parties agreed to settle by arbitration.43 As a result, the 
FAA preempts state laws that treat arbitration provisions less 
favorably than other contract provisions.44 Thus, employees 
may not avoid arbitration by bringing their claims in state 
court as opposed to federal COurt.45 
39 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984). 
40 [d. 
41 [d. at 15-16. 
42 See id. at 17 (holding arbitrable a claim based on California Franchise Invest-
mentLaw). 
43 [d. at 10. 
44 [d. at 16 n.9. Preemption is "[tJhe principle (derived from the Supremacy 
Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or 
regulation. Also termed federal preemption." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1197 (7th ed. 
1999). 
45 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 15 ("We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the 
intent . . . to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right 
dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted. And since 
the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts, 
we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject 
only to federal court jurisdiction."). 
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2. Implications of Arbitrating Title VII Claims 
The U.S. Supreme Court interprets the FAA as Congress's 
declaration that federal policy favors the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements.46 In spite of this policy, mandatory arbi-
tration agreements imposed as a condition of employment still 
give rise to litigation over their enforceability.47 Litigation per-
sists around the widely held concern that arbitration proce-
dures differ from judicial proceedings in ways that may prevent 
employees from fully vindicating civil rights guaranteed to 
them by state and federal statutes.48 The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC"), as the federal 
agency in charge of enforcing federal employment discrimina-
tion laws, recognizes the legitimacy of this concern.49 The 
EEOC takes the position that agreements requiring employees 
to arbitrate workplace discrimination claims as a condition of 
employment are contrary to the principles embodied in these 
civil rights laws.50 
Title VII provides an example of a federal civil rights stat-
ute, enacted to protect each individual's rights to enjoy equal 
employment opportunities and to be free from discrimination in 
the workplace.5 ! The civil rights protected by Title VII "flow 
directly from core Constitutional principles," such as the fun-
damental right to be accorded the equal protection of the laws.52 
Title VII ensures equal employment opportunities by setting 
forth uniform federal standards of discriminatory employment 
46 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
47 See American Arbitration Ass'n, AAA National Rules for the Resolution of 
Employment Disputes, available at 
http://www.adr.orglindex2.I.jsp?lSPssid= 15747 &JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\Nati 
onal_intemational\ .. \..\focusArea\employment\AAA 121 current.html (last visited February 24, 
2004) [hereinafter AAA Rules]. 
48 See, e.g., EEOC Notice, supra note 11. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. 
5! See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (unlawful employment practices). 
52 EEOC Notice, supra note 11; U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born 
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."). 
9
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practices.53 To enforce these standards, Title VII establishes 
the right to bring an action in federal court for employees who 
have been the victims of illegal discriminatory action by their 
employers. 54 Thus, both federal courts and individual employ-
ees playa part in Title VII's enforcement scheme.55 
Federal courts play a vital role in enforcing Title VII and 
other federal employment discrimination statutes "through the 
construction and interpretation of the statutes, the adjudica-
tion of claims, and the issuance of relief. "56 Federal courts in-
terpret anti-discrimination laws and publish written deci-
sions.57 These decisions are exposed to public scrutiny and are 
subject to correction by higher courts and Congress.58 Thus, the 
courts assure that the anti-discrimination laws are applied in 
accordance with their purpose, to ensure equal opportunity in 
employment.59 The public nature of these decisions also ex-
poses employers' discriminatory practices to public consterna-
tion and deters future violations of civil rights laws.60 
In order that courts may fulfill their role in enforcing Title 
VII, individual employees must have access to the judicial fo-
rum to assert their claims.61 Title VII grants this right of ac-
tion to aggrieved employees.62 By bringing claims to court, in-
dividual plaintiffs vindicate both their own interests and the 
public's interest in exposing discriminatory practices and de-
terring future civil rights violations.53 In the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 (hereinafter "the 1991 Act"), Congress reaffirmed the key 
role of individual litigants by amending Title VII to provide 
63 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e·2(a) (2000). 
54 See id. § 2000e-5(O(1). 
55 See, e.g., EEOC Notice, supra note II. 
56 Id. (citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 454 U.S. 461, 479 n.20 







62 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O (2000). 
63 EEOC Notice, supra note 11. 
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additional remedies and protections to victims of dis crimina-
tion.64 For the first time in Title VII's history, the 1991 Act ex-
plicitly provided victims of discrimination with the right to a 
jury trial as one of these additional protections.65 Congress 
passed the 1991 Act to strengthen Title VII in response to find-
ings that U.S. Supreme Court decisions had eroded the stat-
ute's civil rights protections.66 
Viewed in light of the 1991 Act's purpose of strengthening 
Title VII, arbitration procedures are arguably inconsistent with 
the goals and framework of Title VII as amended. The arbitra-
tion of Title VII claims may undermine the policy goals under-
lying the statute by removing civil rights claims from the pub-
lic forum of our nation's courtS.67 Arbitration is a private 
method of dispute resolution.68 Arbitral decisions are binding 
only upon the parties who hired the arbitrator.69 Arbitrators 
are not accountable to the public even if their interpretations of 
Title VII conflict with the public's interest in exposing and 
remedying discrimination in the workplace.70 Moreover, em-
ployers who are found to practice discrimination are shielded 
from public criticism.71 This lack of public disclosure weakens 
the deterrence function of Title VII.72 As a result, the private 
nature of arbitration means that the proceedings are less likely 
to advance the public policies underlying the statute.73 
In addition to potentially undermining the broad social 
policies of Title VII, arbitration proceedings differ from judicial 
proceedings in ways that may adversely affect the fair resolu-
tion of individual employees' claims. First, employees asserting 
Title VII claims may opt to have juries hear and resolve their 
64 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, §§ 2-3, reprinted in notes 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (2000). 
65 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000). 
66 Specifically, Congress found that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), weakened the scope and effective-
ness of Federal civil rights protections. See P.L. 102-166, § 2, reprinted in notes to 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
67 EEOC Notice, supra note 11. 
68 [d. 
69 [d. 
70 See id. ("The nature of the arbitral process allows ... for minimal, if any, pub-
lic accountability of arbitrators or arbitral decision-making."). 
71 [d. 
72 [d. 
73 EEOC Notice, supra note 11. 
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claims.74 Commentators view courts and juries as "more likely 
to adhere to the law, and less likely than arbitrators to 'split 
the difference' between the two sides, thereby lowering dam-
ages awards for plaintiffs."75 In the arbitration process, how-
ever, a jury trial is not an option.76 Second, the arbitrator con-
ducting the proceedings may be biased in favor of "repeat 
player" employers who have previously arbitrated employment 
disputes.77 Such employers are better aware of arbitrators' past 
decisions, while less experienced employees may be unable to 
make an informed selection of arbitrators.78 Third, arbitration 
rules often limit the amount of discovery each party is allowed, 
or leave to the arbitrator decisions regarding the scope of dis-
covery.79 Limitations on discovery may make it difficult for 
employees to obtain from employers the documents and infor-
mation necessary to prove employment discrimination claims.80 
Fourth, the arbitrator may not be required to issue a written 
opinion stating the reasons for his decisions, which limits the 
extent to which arbitral decisions are subject to judicial re-
view.81 As a result, higher courts and Congress often cannot 
scrutinize and correct arbitral decisions.82 
74 [d. See also, 42 u.s.c. § 1981a(c) (2000) (jury trial). 
75 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 119 
(2000) (citing Robert Haig, Corporate Counsel's Guide: Legal Development Report on 
Cost-Effective Management of Corporate Litigation, in FEDERAL PRETRIAL PRACTICE, 
PROCEDURE AND STRATEGY, at 177, 186-187 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. 610, 1999)). 
76 EEOC Notice, supra note 11. 
77 [d. See also, Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 115 (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employ-
ment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 
(1997)). 
78 EEOC Notice, supra note 11. 
79 See, e.g., AAA Rules, supra note 47. Rule 7, relating to discovery, states: "The 
arbitrator shall have the authority to order such discovery._.as the arbitrator considers 
necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in dispute, consistent with the 
expedited nature of arbitration." [d. Discovery refers to "compulsory disclosure, at a 
party's request, of information that relates to the litigation. The primary discovery 
devices are interrogatories, depositions, requests for admissions, and requests for pro-
duction." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 478 (7th ed. 1999). 
80 See EEOC Notice, supra note 11. 
81 [d. Judicial review refers to "a court's review of a lower court's or an adminis-
trative body's factual or legal findings." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 852 (7th ed. 1999). 
82 EEOC Notice, supra note 11. 
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In spite of the potential negative implications of arbitrat-
ing Title VII claims, the U.S. Supreme Court held that these 
attacks on arbitration procedures are insufficient to render an 
arbitration agreement unenforceable.83 Such attacks "rest on 
suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protec-
tions afforded in the substantive law to would-be complain-
ants," and they are "far out of step with [the Court's] current 
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this 
method of resolving disputes."84 Nor is the frequent presence of 
unequal bargaining power between employer and employee an 
adequate basis for finding an arbitration agreement unenforce-
able in the employment context.85 According to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, most federal and "parallel" state statutory 
claims, including employment discrimination claims, may be 
the subjects of an enforceable arbitration agreement contained 
in an employment contract.86 Potential plaintiffs are free to 
waive rights conferred by statute, because "[b]y agreeing to 
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substan-
tive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their reso-
lution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum."87 The as-
sumption that a litigant will be able to fully and effectively vin-
dicate her statutory claim, albeit in an arbitral forum, is a pri-
mary justification for the U.S. Supreme Court's current en-
dorsement of the policy favoring enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.88 
Fairness concerns notwithstanding, employees may opt to 
arbitrate their claims in order to take advantage of the benefits 
associated with arbitration.89 Arbitration allows both parties to 
a dispute to avoid the high costs oflitigation.90 Moreover, arbi-
83 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991). 
84 [d. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAm. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 
481 (1989)). 
85 [d. at 33. 
86 See id. at 26 (listing cases standing for the proposition that various types of 
statutory claims may be the subject of an enforceable arbitration agreement: Mitsubi-
shi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); ShearsonlAm. 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477). 
87 Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628. 
88 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28. 
89 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2001) ("For parties to em-
ployment contracts ... there are real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provi-
sions."). 
90 See id. at 123. 
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tration proceedings are less formal than court proceedings and 
thus may provide swifter resolution of claims.91 Employees of 
average means are in a better position to assert their claims 
when costs and burdens are minimized, particularly because 
employment litigation may involve claims for small amounts of 
money.92 Commentators also urge that arbitration agreements 
increase employees' access to a forum to settle their disputes 
because lower costs and decreased time expenditure make it 
easier for would-be plaintiffs to secure attorney representa-
tion.93 Thus, the availability of an arbitral forum increases the 
likelihood that employees will be equipped to assert their 
claims.94 Employees considering whether to accept an em-
ployer's arbitration agreement should be aware that arbitra-
tion might harbor both benefits and shortcomings when it 
comes to resolving their civil rights claims. 
B. NINTH CIRCUIT PRE-ADAMS II DECISIONS PROTECTED 
EMPLOYEES FROM COMPELLED ARBITRATION OF TITLE VII 
CLAIMS 
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City 
v. Adams II,95 the Ninth Circuit frequently refused to enforce 
arbitration provisions in employment contracts that sought to 
compel employees to arbitrate Title VII employment discrimi-
nation claims.96 For example, in Prudential Insurance Com-
pany v. Lai, the Ninth Circuit held that a Title VII plaintiff 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See Edward A. Marshall, Title VII's Participation Clause and Circuit City 
Stores v. Adams: Making the Foxes the Guardians of the Chickens, 24 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 96-97 (2003). 
94 See id. 
95 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
96 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9'" Cir. 1994); Duffield 
v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); Craft v. Campbell Soup 
Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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could only be forced to arbitrate claims she knowingly agreed to 
submit to arbitration.97 The contract at issue in Lai did not 
specify the types of disputes the parties agreed to arbitrate.98 
"[B]ecause they did not knowingly contract to forego their 
statutory remedies in favor of arbitration," the court held that 
the employee was not bound by a valid agreement to arbitrate 
these employment disputes.99 
Similarly, in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., the 
Ninth Circuit held that employees could not be required, as a 
condition of employment, to waive the right to bring future Ti-
tle VII claims in court. 100 The court found sufficient evidence 
from the text and legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 to conclude that Congress intended to preclude compul-
sory arbitration of Title VII claims.lol One goal of the 1991 Act 
was to strengthen Title VII by making it easier to bring and 
prove lawsuits, and by increasing the available judicial reme-
dies. l02 To augment plaintiffs' options, section 118 of the 1991 
Act encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution meth-
ods, such as arbitration, to resolve employment disputes. loa The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned, however, that it would be paradoxical 
for Congress to intend to strengthen Title VII, yet encourage 
"the use of a process whereby employers condition employment 
on their prospective employees' surrendering their rights to a 
judicial forum for the resolution of all future claims of race or 
sex discrimination."104 The court held that Congress intended 
to encourage voluntary arbitration, but to preclude compulsory 
arbitration of Title VII disputes. l05 
97 Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305 (emphasis added). Knowingly means: "(1) having or show-
ing awareness or understanding; well-informed. For example, a knowing waiver of the 
right to counsel; (2) Deliberate; conscious." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 876 (7th ed. 1999). 
98 Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305. 
99 [d. Other courts have disagreed. See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 99 n.7 
(2000)(citing Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183-184 (3"' Cir. 1998) and 
Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997), and declining to 
decide whether the agreement notified employees they were required to arbitrate 
statutory claims). 
100 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190. 
101 [d. at 1194 (referring to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166). 
102 [d. at 1191 (citing H.R. REp. No. 102-40(1) at 30 (1991) and H.R. REP. No. 102-
40(11) at 1-4 (1991)). 
103 See Pub. L. No. 102-166, §118, reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
104 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193. 
105 [d. at 1193, 1202-1203. The Ninth Circuit, en bane, recently overruled Duf-
field in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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The following year in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., the 
Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not apply to any labor or 
employment contracts.106 Craft, an employee of Campbell Soup 
Company and a union member, filed a grievance with the union 
alleging racial discrimination, harassment, health and safety 
concerns, and other claims.107 Pursuant to a Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement, Craft's claim, if not resolved by the griev-
ance process, would be submitted to arbitration. 108 While his 
grievance was pending, Craft filed suit in federal district court 
alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of 
Title VII, and state law claims for assault and emotional dis-
tress.109 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of California ordered the arbitration of Craft's state law 
claims, but held that Craft could not be compelled to arbitrate 
his Title VII claims.ll0 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not 
apply to the labor agreement that governed Craft's employ-
ment. ll1 At the time the FAA's coverage provision was drafted, 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions had restricted the scope of Con-
gress's commerce power.ll2 The Ninth Circuit determined that 
in enacting the FAA, Congress could only have reached the 
106 Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999). Surprisingly, 
the question had never been previously resolved. [d. at 1090 ("neither this court nor 
the Supreme Court has definitively ruled on whether the FAA applies to labor and 
employment contracts."). 
107 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1084. 
108 [d. A collective-bargaining agreement as it is used in labor law, is "[al contract 
that is made between an employer and a labor union and that regulates employment 
conditions. Also termed collective labor agreement; trade agreement." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 257 (7 th ed. 1999). 
109 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1084. 
110 [d. The district court actually granted summary judgment in favor of Camp-
bell Soup on Craft's state law claims. [d. at 1084 nA ("the court agrees Campbell's 
motion for summary judgment is equivalent to motion to compel arbitration under 9 
U.S.C. § 4."). Campbell Soup appealed that portion of the district court's decision. [d. 
at 1084. Summary judgment is "[al judgment granted on a claim about which there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and upon which the movant is entitled to prevail as a 
matter of law. This procedural device allows the speedy disposition of a controversy 
without the need for trial." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1449 (7 th ed. 1999). 
111 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1094. 
112 [d. at 1086-1087 (referring to Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), 
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Howard v. lllinois Cent. R.R., 
207 U.S. 463 (1908); United Leather Workers' Int'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk 
Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924». "Commerce power" refers to the constitutional grant of 
power to Congress "[tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
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employment contracts of workers who actually transported 
people or goods in interstate commerce.1l3 Section 1 of the FAA 
then exempted those same employment contracts from the 
FAA's coverage.1l4 The Ninth Circuit concluded, therefore, that 
Congress did not intend the FAA to cover any employment con-
tracts.1l5 In Craft, the Ninth Circuit became the only federal 
court of appeals to hold that the FAA did not govern arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts.1l6 
C. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT STEPS IN: CIRCUIT CITY V. 
ADAMS I AND II 
1. Circuit City v. Adams I 
In Circuit City u. Adams (hereinafter "Adams I"), Adams, 
the plaintiff, completed and signed a portion of the Circuit City 
job application, entitled Circuit City Dispute Resolution Agree-
ment (hereinafter "DRA").ll7 The agreement required employ-
ees to submit all claims to mutually binding arbitration, and 
was a mandatory prerequisite to employment with Circuit 
CityYs Two years later, Adams filed an employment discrimi-
nation suit against Circuit City in state court, under Califor-
nia's Fair Employment and Housing Act (hereinafter 
"FEHA")Y9 Pursuant to the FAA, Circuit City filed suit in fed-
eral district court to stay the state court action and to compel 
113 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1087. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
114 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1087 (9 th Cir. 1999). See also, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (containing 
an exemption from the FAA's coverage: "but nothing herein contained shall apply to 
contracts for employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."). 
115 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1087. See also, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) and supra note 114. 
116 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109, 111 (2001) (citations omitted). 
117 Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999). 
118 Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d at 107l. 
119 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110. The California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA), CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West Supp. 2004). Unlawful 
employment practices are set forth in CAL. Gov. CODE § 12940 ( "It shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, 
except where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United 
States or the State of California: (a) For an employer, because of the race, religious 
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical 
condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation of any person, to refuse to hire 
or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to 
employment, or to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training 
program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation 
or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. "). 
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Adams to arbitrate his claims.120 The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California held that the DRA 
obligated Adams to submit to arbitration.121 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and in light of its fresh 
holding in Craft, the court reasoned that if the DRA was con-
sidered an employment contract, then the FAA did not apply.122 
The court defined "employment contract" as "an agreement set-
ting forth 'terms and conditions' of employment," and found 
that the DRA met this definition.123 In a brief per curiam opin-
ion, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court lacked juris-
diction to compel arbitration under the FAA, reversed the dis-
trict court's order compelling arbitration, and remanded the 
case for dismissal. 124 
2. Circuit City v. Adams II 
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Adams I, the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the ques-
tion of whether the FAA applies to employment contracts. 125 In 
Adams II, the U.S. Supreme Court held that § 1 of the FAA 
exempts only the employment contracts of transportation 
workers, not employment contracts in general.126 In reaching 
120 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110. A stay is "(1) the postponement or 
halting of a proceeding, judgment, or (2) an order to suspend all or part of a judicial 
proceeding or a judgment resulting from that proceeding." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 
1425 (7'" ed. 1999). 
121 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110. 
122 Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071. See also, Craft, 177 F.3d at 1094. 
123 Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Modzelewski v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 14 F.3d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1994». 
124 Id. at 1072. A per curiam opinion is "an opinion handed down by an appellate 
court without identifying the individual judge who wrote the opinion." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 1119 (7'" ed. 1999). 
125 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110-111. A Writ of Certiorari is "an ex-
traordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing a lower court 
to deliver the record in the case for review. The U.S. Supreme Court uses certiorari to 
review most of the cases that it decides to hear." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 220 (7'" ed. 
1999). 
126 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 119. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) {"'Maritime 
transactions,' as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading of water carriers, 
agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, colli-
sions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, 
would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; 'commerce,' as herein defined, means 
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the 
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and an-
other, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the 
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein 
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this decision, the Court first rejected Adams's contention that 
the word "transaction" in § 2 refers only to commercial transac-
tions, therefore his employment contract was not a "contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce" within the mean-
ing of the FAA's coverage provision.127 The Court reasoned that 
Adams's interpretation of § 2, which excluded all employment 
contracts as beyond the scope of the FAA, would render mean-
ingless the separate exemption in § 1 for "contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
workers engaged in interstate commerce. "128 Furthermore, the 
Court previously interpreted the words "involving commerce" 
in § 2 as expressing Congress's intention to legislate to the 
broadest limits of the commerce power.129 For these reasons, 
the Court concluded that the § 2 coverage provision is not lim-
ited to commercial deals, but rather is sufficiently broad to 
reach employment contracts. 130 Therefore, any argument that 
the FAA does not cover employment contracts would necessar-
ily rely on the exemption contained in § l,131 
Having decided that the arbitration provisions in Adams's 
employment contract were governed by the FAA, the Court 
went on to decide whether such contracts were removed from 
the FAA's coverage by the exemption in § 1 for "contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class 
of workers engaged in interstate commerce. "132 Adams argued 
that the Court's broad interpretation of "involving commerce" 
in § 2 brings within the scope of the FAA all contracts that 
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.") (emphasis added). 
127 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 113. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) ("A written 
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract 
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement 
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a con-
tract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.") (emphasis 
added). 
128 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 113 (quoting Pennsylvania Dept. of Public 
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) ("Our cases express a deep reluctance 
to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the 
same enactment."». See also, supra note 126 (text of9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000». 
129 Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995). 
130 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 113-114. 
131Id. 
132Id. at 114 (referring to 9 U.S.C. § 1). 
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Congress had authority to regulate.133 In turn, § 1 exempts all 
employment contracts within that authority.134 To dispose of 
this argument, the Court employed the statutory canon ejus-
dem generis, "[w]here general words follow specific words in a 
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to em-
brace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumer-
ated by the preceding specific words."135 The Court concluded 
that the residual clause, "or any other class of workers engaged 
in interstate commerce," exempts only the contracts of employ-
ees similar in nature to "seamen and railroad employees."136 In 
other words, § 1 exempts only workers actually engaged in the 
transportation aspect of interstate commerce.137 
Consequently, Adams's employment contract fell within 
the ambit of the F AA.138 Pursuant to the FAA and the Circuit 
City DRA, Adams's claims were subject to compelled arbitra-
tion, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the 
revocation of any contract. "139 Moreover, the Court stated, "ar-
bitration agreements can be enforced without contravening the 
policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific 
protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law."14o 
Adams II makes clear that employers whose business activities 
touch interstate commerce may invoke the FAA to compel em-
ployees to arbitrate claims covered by the employers' arbitra-
tion agreements, including statutory employment discrimina-
tion claims.141 Conversely, employers can lawfully decline to 
hire prospective employees who refuse to sign mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements.142 
133 [d. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. at 114-115 (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND 
STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION§ 47.17 (1991)). 
136 [d. at 115 (referring to 9 U.S.C. § 1). 
137 [d. (referring to 9 U.S.C. § 1). 
138 See id. at 124 (reversing Ninth Circuit decision that Adams's contract was 
outside of the scope ofthe FAA). 
139 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
140 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 123. 
141 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) ("A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or 
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition 
any United States district court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed 
in the manner provided for in such agreement."). 
142 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 123. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Adams II is not 
without controversy.143 The Court's opinion acknowledged that 
various amici, including the attorneys general of twenty-one 
states, objected to the Court's interpretation of § 1 of the 
FAA. 144 The attorneys general argued that the application of 
the FAA to employment contracts violates the presumption 
against federal preemption in areas traditionally regulated by 
the states.145 In essence, the amici asserted that: (1) the law of 
employment relations, particularly employment discrimination 
law, is an area of traditional state authority; (2) states have a 
strong interest in developing employment discrimination law 
and in enforcing their laws in this area; (3) mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements frustrate the purposes of state civil rights 
laws; and finally, (4) each state should be permitted to make its 
own ultimate determination regarding the enforceability of 
mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment con-
text. 146 The Court dismissed these objections as misplaced, 
stating that the "proper target of this criticism" is Southland v. 
Keating, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA 
applies in state courts and preempts state laws that are hostile 
to arbitration. 147 
143 See, e.g., id. at 133 (Souter, J., with whom Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., and 
Breyer, J. join, dissenting). 
144 [d. at 121. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of the States of California, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, lllinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Penn-
sylvania, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia, in support of Respondent, Adams 
(No. 99-1379), Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), available in 2000 WL 
1369472. "Amicus Curiae" is Latin for "friend of the court," and refers to "a person who 
is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file 
a brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter. 
Plural amici curiae." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 1999). 
145 Brief of Amicus Curiae of the States of California, Ariwna, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Idaho, lllinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Ver-
mont, Washington, and West Virginia, in support of Respondent, Adams (No. 99-1379), 
Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), available in 2000 WL 1369472, at *1-2. 
146 [d. 
147 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 122 (citing Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 
(1984». 
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The U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Adams II that 
Congress never overturned Southland. 148 The Congressional 
response to Adams II, however, is not yet clear. Since Adams 
II, various bills have been introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives, "to amend [the Federal Arbitration Act], to allow 
employees the right to accept or reject the use of arbitration to 
resolve an employment controversy."149 None, however, have 
gained much support.150 Similarly, the California Assembly 
Judiciary Committee endorsed a bill that would have "invali-
dated arbitration agreements between employers and employ-
ees that relate to employment practices covered by the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act [FEHA], that are required as a 
condition of employment or continued employment."151 Former 
California Governor Gray Davis vetoed the measure.152 Until 
these legislators garner the support they need to amend the 
FAA, the U.S. Supreme Court's determination that employers 
may force employees to arbitrate workplace discrimination 
claims remains the law. 153 
II. NINTH CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
ADAMS II 
Following its decision in Adams II, the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted petitions for writs of certiorari for several Ninth 
Circuit cases, and remanded those cases for further considera-
148 [d. (citing Southland, 465 U.S. 1). 
149 H.R. 540, 108'" Congo (2003) (introduced in House of Representatives, February 
5, 2003). See also H.R. 2282, 107th Congo (2001) (previous version introduced in House 
of Representatives, June 21, 2001, "[t]o amend title 9 of the United States Code to 
exclude all employment contracts from the arbitration provisions of chapter 1 of such 
title."). 
150 H.R. 540, 108'" Congo (2003), introduced in House of Representatives on Feb-
ruary 5, 2003, was still in House Committee as of March 7, 2004. According to 
www.westJaw.com. database BC (BillCast), H.R. 540 has a 3% chance of passing the 
House Committee. H.R. 2282, 107th Congo (2001), failed to pass the 107" Congress. 
151 A.B. 1715, Cal. Assem., Reg. Sess. 2003-2004 (Cal. 2003). 
152 See Linda Rapattoni, Bills on Retaliation, Arbitration Vetoed, SAN FRANCISCO 
DAILY JOURNAL, October 14, 2003, at 1 (Governor Gray Davis vetoed A.B. 1715, a bill 
by the Assembly Judiciary Committee that would have barred employers from forcing 
employees to arbitrate disputes governed by FERA). 
153 See Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) ("arbitration agreements 
can be enforced without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving 
employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law."). 
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tion in light of its holding. 154 Adams II was remanded to the 
Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the U.S. 
Supreme Court's opinion.155 In Circuit City v. Adams III (here-
inafter "Adams IIr), the Ninth Circuit held that the arbitra-
tion agreement in Circuit City's DRA was unconscionable un-
der California law and refused to order Adams to arbitrate his 
claims. 156 In several other remanded cases, the Ninth Circuit 
applied the doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate manda-
tory arbitration clauses.157 These cases illustrate that even af-
ter Adams II, the Ninth Circuit remains just as unlikely to en-
force mandatory arbitration agreements that are required as a 
condition of employment. ISS In the wake of the pro-arbitration 
mandate of 
Adams II, the Ninth Circuit has consistently invalidated 
agreements that compel employee arbitration, an end that nei-
ther federal nor state legislators have been able to accomplish. 
The Ninth Circuit's post-Adams II decisions rely on § 2 of 
the FAA, which allows employees to rescind arbitration agree-
ments if they can show traditional grounds for invalidating 
contracts such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.159 The 
154 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted, 532 U.S. 938 (2001); Circuit City Stores v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003), 
cert. granted, 532 U.S. 938 (2001). 
155 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 124. 
156 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002). 
157 See supra note 13 for a definition of unconscionability. See infra Parts II-A 
and II-C for a discussion of cases in which the Ninth Circuit invalidated arbitration 
agreements on unconscionability grounds. 
158 CAL. Cw. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985) ("If the court as a matter of law finds 
the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it 
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder 
of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of 
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."). 
159 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 892. Fraud 
refers to "a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to 
induce another to act to his or her detriment. In contract law, fraud also refers to 
unconscionable dealing; the unconscientious use of the power arising out of the parties' 
relative positions and resulting in an unconscionable bargain." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 670 (7th ed. 1999). Duress broadly refers to "the threat of confinement or 
detention, or other threat of harm, used to compel a person to do something against his 
or her will or judgment. Duress is a recognized defense to a contractual breach." 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 250 (7th ed. 1999). Unconscionability refers to "(1) extreme 
unfairness, or (2) the principle that a court may refuse to enforce a contract that is 
unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during contract formation or because 
of overreaching contractual terms, especially terms that are unreasonably favorable to 
one party while precluding meaningful choice for the other party." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 1526 (7th ed. 1999). 
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Ninth Circuit held the arbitration agreements unconscionable 
for primarily three reasons.160 First, when arbitration agree-
ments are a required condition of employment, employees can-
not negotiate or reject the agreement's terms.161 The Ninth Cir-
cuit considers such agreements to be procedurally unconscion-
able.162 Second, because employers are unlikely to bring typical 
employment-related suits against employees, the arbitration 
agreements lack bilaterality.163 Such agreements are consid-
ered unfairly one-sided because the employee gives up her right 
to have her claims resolved in a judicial forum, while her em-
ployer, who is unlikely to sue its employees, makes no recipro-
. cal sacrifice. l64 Finally, Ninth Circuit considers terms con-
tained in arbitration agreements that restrict the employee's 
rights under employment discrimination statutes to be sub-
stantively unconscionable.165 
160 See infra notes 161-229 and accompanying text. 
161 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893 ("The [arbitrationl agreement 
is a prerequisite to employment, and job applicants are not permitted to modifY the 
agreement's terms-they must take the contract or leave it."). 
162 See infra notes 166-229 and accompanying text for examples of cases assessing 
procedural unconscionability in the making of arbitration agreements. 
163 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893-894 ("the [arbitration agree-
mentl unilaterally forces employees to arbitrate claims against the employer."). The 
use of the term "bilaterality" in the unconscionability context should not be confused 
with the more common usage of "bilateral" in the sense of a bilateral contract. A bilat-
eral contract is "a contract in which each party promises a performance, so that each 
party is an obligor on that party's own promise and an obligee on the other's promise." 
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 318 (7 th ed. 1999). In requiring "bilaterality" in an employ-
ment arbitration agreement, the California Supreme Court concluded: "Given the basic 
and substantial nature of the rights at issue [namely, the benefits and protections the 
right to a judicial forum provides], we find that the unilateral obligation to arbitrate is 
itself so one-sided as to be substantively unconscionable." Armendariz v. Found. 
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 117 (2000) (adopting the language in 
Kinney v. United Healthcare Services, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1332 (1999». 
164 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893-894; Circuit City v. Ingle, 328 
F.3d 1165, 1173-1174 (9 th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Circuit City's argument that the em-
ployer is subjected to same arbitration terms as employees because the only claims 
realistically affected by the agreement are those employee would initiate against em-
ployer). 
165 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 894-895; Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1171; 
Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9 th Cir. 2003) (finding DRA substantively 
unconscionable because it required employees to arbitrate statutory claims without the 
benefit of a full range of statutory remedies). 
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A. ON REMAND: CIRCUIT CITY V. ADAMS III 
The Ninth Circuit's treatment of Adams II on remand il-
lustrates how the court applies these principles of unconscion-
ability to invalidate employment arbitration agreements. The 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Adams II that Adams's em-
ployment contract is within the scope of the FAA.166 The DRA's 
provisions for compelled arbitration are "valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity 
for the revocation of any contract." 167 The FAA thus allows em-
ployees to revoke arbitration agreements if they can prove tra-
ditional grounds for invalidating contracts, such as uncon-
scionability.16B In Adams III, Adams asserted that the DRA is 
an unconscionable adhesion contract.169 Because he was em-
ployed in California, the Ninth Circuit looked to California con-
tract law to determine whether the agreement is valid.170 
Applying California law, the court easily found that ele-
ments of both procedural and substantive unconscionability 
infected Circuit City's DRA.171 In assessing the procedural as-
pect of unconscionability, the court considered the respective 
bargaining power of the parties at the time the contract was 
formed. 172 The DRA was a standard-form contract, drafted by 
Circuit City, the party with superior bargaining power.173 Ad-
ams had no opportunity to negotiate or modify its terms.174 Be-
cause it was offered as a take-it-or-Ieave-it prerequisite to Ad-
ams's employment, the court determined that the DRA was a 
166 See Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (reversing Ninth Circuit 
decision that Adams's contract was not within the scope of the FAA). 
167 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added). 
168 Id. 
169 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 892. An adhesion contract is a standard-
ized contract drafted by the party with superior bargaining power, usually the em-
ployer, which is imposed on the weaker party, usually the employee, on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113. Because there is no opportunity to reject 
or negotiate the terms of the agreement, adhesive contracts have potential to be unfair 
to the weaker party. Id. at 115. Adhesion contracts are enforceable, however, unless a 
court determines they contain terms that are unconscionable, or "so one-sided as to 
shock the conscience." Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Kinney v. United Healthcare 
Services, Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1330 (1999». 
170 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 892. 





Bandics: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
100 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
procedurally unconscionable adhesion contract.175 Adams III 
makes clear that an arbitration agreement required as a condi-
tion of employment is considered procedurally unconscionable, 
at least where the employer has a stronger bargaining position 
than the prospective employee.176 
Turning from the formation process to the substantive 
terms of the agreement, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
DRA was substantively unconscionable because it contained 
terms that were "unduly harsh" or oppressive.177 The Ninth 
Circuit found that the DRA did not require Circuit City to arbi-
trate claims against employees.178 It then held that "this unjus-
tified one-sidedness deprive[d] the DRA of the "modicum of bi-
laterality"179 that the California Supreme Court requires for 
contracts to be enforceable under California law."180 Addition-
ally, the DRA restricted Adams's ability to fully vindicate his 
statutory claims by limiting the relief available to him, requir-
ing him to split arbitration costs with the employer, and pro-
viding for a one-year statute of limitations on the arbitration of 
his claims.l8l Having determined the DRA to be both proce-
durally and substantively unconscionable, the court concluded 
that the objectionable provisions "pervaded" the agreement.182 
Rather than sever the unconscionable terms, the Ninth Circuit 
refused to enforce the entire arbitration agreement.183 
175 [d. 
176 This is illustrated by Ninth Circuit cases since Adams III, including Circuit 
City v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) and Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 
1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). See also, Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 
2002); Circuit City v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1106, 1108, n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no proce-
dural unconscionability where employees had an opportunity to opt out of the arbitra-
tion program). 
177 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893 (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health 
Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000». 
178/d. 
179 In requiring a "modicum of bilaterality" to enforce an arbitration agreement, 
the California Supreme Court explained: "Given the disadvantages that may exist for 
plaintiffs arbitrating disputes, it is unfairly one-sided for an employer with superior 
bargaining power to impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to accept 
such limitations when it seeks to prosecute a claim against the employee, without at 
least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness based on 'business realities .... 
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 117. See also, supra note 163. 
ISO Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893 (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 118). 
181/d. 
182 Id. at 895-896. 
183 Id. (noting court's discretion under California law to sever an unconscionable 
term or refuse to enforce the contract in its entirety pursuant to CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1670.5(a) (West 1985». 
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B. APPLYING UNCONSCIONABILITY IN OTHER CASES: 
VOLUNTARY EQUALS ENFORCEABLE 
Following its decision to invalidate the arbitration agree-
ment in Adams III, the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of two 
other Circuit City arbitration agreements. l84 In Circuit City v. 
Ahmed, the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the order of the 
United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia compelling arbitration of Ahmed's claims under FEHA, 
based on Craft's holding that employment contracts are ex-
empted from the FAA's coverage. lS5 The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, and remanded the case for further consid-
eration in light of its decision in Adams II.ls6 On remand, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling ar-
bitration.ls7 Similarly, in Circuit City v. Najd, the court upheld 
the validity of the DRA's arbitration provisions. ISS 
Relying on one key factor, the Ninth Circuit distinguished 
the arbitration agreements at issue in both Ahmed and Najd 
from that which it refused to enforce in Adams III.ls9 Both 
Ahmed and Najd had an opportunity to decline participation in 
the arbitration program by mailing in a one-page form. 190 
Therefore, neither Ahmed's nor N ajd's contracts were proce-
durally unconscionable because they were free to accept or re-
ject the arbitration clause without risking their continued em-
ployment with Circuit City.19l Absent a showing of procedural 
unconscionability by Ahmed or Najd, the court declined to ad-
dress their arguments that the agreements were substantively 
unconscionable, and upheld the agreements as valid.192 
In contrast to Ahmed and N ajd, Adams was required to 
sign the arbitration agreement contained in his Circuit City job 
184 Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002). Circuit City v. Najd, 294 
F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002). 
185 Circuit City v. Ahmed, 195 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing district court 
order compelling arbitration based on Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F .3d 1083, 1086 
(9th Cir. 1999». 
186 See Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 
938(2001). 
187 Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1200. 
188 Najd, 294 F.3d at 1109. 
189 See Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108. 
190 See Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108. 
191 See Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108. 
192 Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1200; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108. 
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application before he could be considered for employment.193 
The arbitration agreement was an adhesion contract because 
Adams had to either accept Circuit City's terms, or reject the 
entire contract along with the job.194 Circuit City's superior 
bargaining power is buttressed by the fact that few employees 
are in a position to refuse employment because of an arbitra-
tion clause.195 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit found the 
DRA at issue in Adams III to be a procedurally unconscionable 
adhesion contract. 196 The pattern established by Adams III, on 
one hand, and by Ahmed and Najd on the other hand, indicates 
that the Ninth Circuit will not enforce an arbitration agree-
ment upon which employment is conditioned, so long as the 
party opposing arbitration also establishes an element of sub-
stantive unconscionability.197 
C. PRESUMED UNCONSCIONABLE: CIRCUIT CITYV. INGLE 
Similarly to Adams, Ingle, the plaintiff in Circuit City v. 
Ingle, was required to sign an arbitration agreement before 
Circuit City considered her employment application. 198 Three 
years after Circuit City hired her, Ingle filed suit against Cir-
cuit City in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of California.199 She alleged claims of sexual harass-
ment, sex discrimination and disability discrimination under 
FEHA, and sex discrimination and retaliation claims under 
Title VII.200 Circuit City moved to compel arbitration pursuant 
to the FAA, but the district court denied the motion on the 
ground that Circuit City unlawfully conditioned Ingle's em-
193 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 891-892. 
194 Id. at 893. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 See, e.g., id. (holding the arbitration provisions in Adams's DRA unconscion-
able based on findings of both procedural and substantive unconscionability). Cf Ah-
med, 283 F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108 (finding no procedural unconscionabil-
ity, therefore declining to address arguments as to substantive unconscionability, and 
holding the DRA a valid, enforceable contract). 
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ployment upon her agreement to forego statutory rights and 
remedies.201 
The district court relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., which held that employ-
ees may not be required, as a condition of employment, to 
waive their right to bring future Title VII claims in court.202 
The Ninth Circuit, however, overruled Duffield.203 In an en 
bane decision, the Ninth Circuit disavowed Duffield and held 
that no conflict exists between the purpose of Title VII and 
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims.204 In overruling Duf-
field, the Ninth Circuit ostensibly brought its position in line 
with other circuits, and with the U.S. Supreme Court.205 In re-
ality, however, the impact of this decision is minimal. The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that Duffield was called into question 
by the U.S. Supreme Court's broad pronouncement in Adams II 
that "arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA 
without contravening the policies of congressional enactments 
giving employees specific protection against discrimination 
prohibited by federal law. "206 Since Adams II, the Ninth Circuit 
has not relied on Duffield to invalidate agreements to arbitrate 
Title VII claims. Rather, it has invalidated arbitration agree-
ments based on state law unconscionability grounds.207 The 
Ninth Circuit's reliance on state law contract defenses to in-
validate arbitration agreements is evidence that it has not em-
braced the federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements in employment contracts. 
201Id. The district court based its ruling on Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens, & 
Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employee cannot be compelled to 
arbitrate Title VII claims). Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1169. 
202 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190, overruled by EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & 
Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003). 
203 Luce, Forward, 345 F.3d at 750-751. 
204 Id. En banc is French for "on the bench," and refers to "a decision rendered 
with all judges present and participating; in full court." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 546 
(7 th ed. 1999). 
205 Luce, Forward, 345 F.3d at 748-749. 
206 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001). 
207 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9 th Cir. 2002); Circuit City 
v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (invalidating DRA found unconscionable under California law). C{. Circuit 
City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); Circuit City v. Najd, 294 F.3d 
1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding DRA absent procedural unconscionability). 
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On appeal in Ingle, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court's denial of Circuit City's motion to compel arbitration.208 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Circuit City arbitration 
agreement was unconscionable under California law, without 
relying on Duffield.209 The court found that Circuit City's supe-
rior bargaining power precluded Ingle "from enjoying a mean-
ingful opportunity to negotiate and choose the terms of the con-
tract. "210 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow Circuit 
City to rely on Ahmed or Najd to support its contention that 
the DRA in Ingle was not procedurally unconscionable.211 The 
arbitration agreements in Ahmed and Najd were not proce-
durally unconscionable only because the employees in those 
cases each had an opportunity to opt out of the arbitration pro-
gram.212 Ingle had no such opportunity.213 Therefore, Ar!rr,ms 
III, rather than Ahmed and Najd, controlled the Ninth Circuit's 
finding that Ingle's agreement was procedurally unconscion-
able.214 
Turning next to the question of substantive unconscion-
ability, the Ninth Circuit found that the DRA at issue in Ingle 
required arbitration of claims brought by employees, but not 
claims brought by Circuit City.215 As in Adams III, this "one-
sidedness" deprived the DRA of the bilaterality required to en-
force the contract under California law.216 Circuit City argued 
that the terms of the agreement applied equally to its own 
claims, but to no avail.217 The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
only employees' claims are "realistically affected" by the 
agreement because of the unlikelihood that Circuit City would 
initiate an action against lower-level employees.218 Thus, "the 
lucre of the arbitration agreement flows one way: the employee 
relinquishes rights while the employer generally reaps the 
208 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1169. 
209 Id. at 1180. 
210 Id. at 1171 (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1532 
(1997». 




215 Id. at 1173. 
216Id. 
217Id. 
218Id. at 1173-1174. 
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benefits of arbitrating employment disputes."219 In other words, 
when employees promise to forgo their rights to a judicial fo-
rum, employers obtain an advantage but make no reciprocal 
s acrifice. 220 
Based on this assumption, the Ninth Circuit went a step 
further in Ingle than it did in Adams III. The Ninth Circuit 
held that under California law, arbitration contracts between 
employers and employees raise a rebuttable presumption of 
substantive unconscionability.221 This holding alters the usual 
procedure under California law by which a party to an arbitra-
tion agreement may ask a court to compel arbitration pursuant 
to the agreement and to the FAA. 222 A court following that pro-
219Id. at 1174. 
220 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 
117 (2000) ("Given the disadvantages that may exist for plaintiffs arbitrating disputes, 
it is unfairly one-sided for an employer with superior bargaining power to impose arbi-
tration on the employee as plaintiff but not to accept such limitations when it seeks to 
prosecute a claim against the employee, without at least some reasonable justification 
for such one-sidedness."). 
221 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174 (emphasis added). 
222 CAL. CODE CIV. FRoc. § 1281.2 (West 1982) ("On petition of a party to an arbi-
tration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a contro-
versy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall 
order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines 
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) 
The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist 
for the revocation of the agreement. Subsection (c) provides in relevant part: A party to 
the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceed-
ing with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transac-
tions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. 
For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an 
action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to 
compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the peti-
tion ... If the court determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy 
exists, an order to arbitrate such controversy may not be refused on the ground that 
the petitioner's contentions lack substantive merit. If the court determines that there 
are other issues between the petitioner and the respondent which are not subject to 
arbitration and which are the subject of a pending action or special proceeding between 
the petitioner and the respondent and that a determination of such issues may make 
the arbitration unnecessary, the court may delay its order to arbitrate until the deter-
mination of such other issues or until such earlier time as the court specifies. If the 
court determines that a party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending 
court action or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c) 
herein, the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order 
intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may 
order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration 
among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or 
special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay 
arbitration pending the outcome ofthe court action or special proceeding."). California 
courts have held that CAL. CODE CIV. FROC. § 1281.2, subsection (c) is preempted by 
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cedure must first decide whether the agreement to arbitrate 
exists.223 The party seeking arbitration must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that such agreement exists because 
the court may not compel arbitration unless ~he parties have 
themselves agreed to arbitrate.224 If an agreement exists but 
the party opposing arbitration raises a defense to preclude its 
enforcement, the court must then decide whether the agree-
ment is enforceable.225 The party opposing arbitration must 
prove the elements of its defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence.226 Usually, employees challenging the enforceability 
of an arbitration agreement must prove why it should not be 
enforced.227 Ingle's holding shifts this burden to employers to 
show why the contract should be enforced.228 Ingle instructs 
courts within the Ninth Circuit to presume that employment 
arbitration agreements are substantively unconscionable 
unless the employer can demonstrate that the effect of the arbi-
tration contract is bilateral.229 
III. A POSITIVE APPROACH TO UNCONSCIONABILITY UNDER 
CALIFORNIA LAW: ARMENDARIZ V. FOUNDATION HEALTH 
PSYCHCARE SERVICES 
The Ninth Circuit decisions to invalidate arbitration con-
tracts on unconscionability grounds rely heavily on the Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision in Armendariz v. Foundation 
the FAA. See Warren-Guthrie v. Health Net, 84 Cal. App. 4th 804, 811, 812 (2000) 
("Section 1281.2(c), which allows the state court to disregard an arbitration clause due 
to the possibility of inconsistent rulings, is clearly inconsistent with the FAA's general 
mandate requiring enforcement of arbitration clauses ... We hold, therefore, that 
section 1281.2 has been preempted by the FAA if it is used in order to avoid or delay 
arbitration of a contract dispute governed by the FAA."). The United States Supreme 
Court held that "application of the California statute [section 1281.2(c») is not pre-
empted by the [FAA) in a case where the parties have agreed that their arbitration 
agreement will be governed by the law of California." Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland 
Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989). 





228 Circuit City v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003). 
229 [d. (emphasis added). 
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Health Psychcare Seruices. 23o It should be noted at the outset 
that Armendariz was decided before the U.S. Supreme Court 
definitively ruled that the FAA applies to employment con-
tracts.231 Furthermore, Armendariz was not decided under the 
FAA, but rather under a state law equivalent entitled the Cali-
fornia Arbitration Act (hereinafter "CAA").232 These distinc-
tions are inconsequential, however, because the CAA specifi-
cally covers agreements between employers and employees, 
and because the language of the CAA echoes the FAA's cover-
age provision.233 Similarly to federal law, California law favors 
the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements contained in 
employment contracts.234 Under both the CAA and the FAA, 
arbitration agreements may only be invalidated on grounds of 
fraud, duress, or unconscionability.235 
In Armendariz, two employees filed claims of wrongful 
termination against their former employer, Foundation Health 
Psychcare Services, alleging they were terminated because of 
their sexual orientation (heterosexual) in violation of FEHA.236 
Before they were hired, both employees signed employment 
applications that included clauses requiring arbitration of fu-
ture wrongful termination claims.237 Subsequently, both em-
ployees signed separate employment agreements containing 
the same arbitration clause.238 When the employees filed suit, 
the employer moved for an order compelling arbitration of the 
230 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Ingle, 328 F.3d 
1165; Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Armendariz v. Found. 
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000». 
231 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000), was decided August 24, 2000, compared with 
Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), decided March 21, 200l. 
232 The California Arbitration Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1982) ("A 
written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy 
thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist 
for the revocation of any contract."). Compare the FAA's coverage provision. 9 U.S.C. § 
2 (2000) ("A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." ). 
233 See supra note 232. See also, Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 98. 
234 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 97. 
235 Id. at 114. See also, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1982); 9 U.S.C. § 2 
(2000). 
236 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 91, 92 n.1 ("Same-sex harassment has been held 
unlawful under the FEHA. "). 
237 Id. at 9l. 
236 Id. at 91-92. 
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employees' claims pursuant to the CAA.239 The trial court con-
cluded that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.240 
The trial court also found that several provisions of the agree-
ment contributed to its overall unfairness. As a result, the en-
tire agreement was held invalid.241 The Court of Appeal for the 
First District reversed the trial court's decision, severed the 
unconscionable terms, and held that the remainder of the arbi-
tration agreement should be enforced.242 The California Su-
preme Court granted review.243 
The agreement before the California Supreme Court in 
Armendariz required employees to submit all wrongful termi-
nation claims to binding arbitration.244 The employer, however, 
remained free to file suit in court.245 The employees were first 
required to sign the arbitration agreements before they could 
be hired, and again later in order to keep their jobs.246 More-
over, the employees had no opportunity to negotiate the terms 
of the agreements.247 For these reasons, the Armendariz court 
determined that the arbitration agreements were adhesion con-
tracts.248 Given the "economic pressure" felt by employees en-
gaged in job searches and hiring processes, the court found that 
the adhesive nature of the arbitration agreements rendered the 
formation of the agreements procedurally unconscionable.249 
In finding the agreement procedurally unconscionable, the 
Armendariz court emphasized that most employees presented 
with pre-employment arbitration agreements are not in a posi-
tion to refuse a job because the employer requires arbitration.250 
Secondly, the California Supreme Court recognized the overall 
benefits of arbitration to employees, including reduced cost, 
expeditious resolution of claims, and informal proceedings.251 It 
239 [d. at 92. See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982). 
240 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 92. 
241 [d. 
242 [d. at 93. 
243 [d. 
244 [d. at 91. 
245 [d. at 118. 
246 [d. at 114-115. 
247 [d. 
248 [d. 
249 [d. at 115. 
250 [d. 
251 [d. (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 
1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 189 (1997». 
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also warned, however, that such advantages are balanced by 
disadvantages to employees, such as waiver of the right to a 
jury trial, limited discovery and judicial review, and often, re-
duction of the size of employee awards.252 The Armendariz 
court also acknowledged that while voluntary arbitration is 
favored in California, "voluntariness has been its bedrock justi-
fication. "253 For these reasons, the Armendariz court instructed 
California courts to be "particularly attuned" to claims by em-
ployees that employers with superior bargaining power im-
posed oppressive arbitration agreements.254 
Before a court may refuse to enforce an agreement on un-
conscionability grounds, it must find that the contract contains 
elements of both procedural and substantive unconscionabil-
ity.255 In addition to being procedurally unconscionable, the 
Armendariz court found that certain terms contained in the 
arbitration agreements were substantively unconscionable as 
well.256 First, the arbitration agreements lacked bilaterality.257 
The arbitration clause did not expressly authorize the employer 
to litigate claims in court. 258 The wording of the clause im-
plied, however, that employees agreed to arbitrate claims aris-
ing out of wrongful termination, but not employers.259 In addi-
tion to lacking bilaterality, the arbitration clause also re-
stricted the amount of the employees' damage awards under 
FEHA, while no such restriction applied to the employer.26o 
These "multiple defects" led the court to conclude that the 
agreement was "permeated" by unconscionability, thus entirely 
unenforceable.261 
The agreement in Armendariz was limited in scope to 
wrongful termination claims, a claim employers typically would 
252 [d. (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 
1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 189 (1997». 
253 [d. (emphasis added). 
254 [d. 
255 [d. at 114. 
256 [d. at 116. 
257 [d. at 120. 
258 [d. at 92. The arbitration clause signed by the employees stated in part: "I 
agree as a condition of my employment, that in the event my employment is termi-
nated, and 1 contend that such termination was wrongful ... 1 and Employer agree to 
submit any such matter to binding arbitration .... " [d. 
259 [d. 
260 [d. at 121. 
261 [d. at 126. 
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not bring against employees.262 Still, the court found that this 
fact could not justify the agreement's limitation to employee 
claims.263 The Armendariz court stated, however, that an arbi-
tration agreement need not require the arbitration of all claims 
between employers and employees in order to be bilateral.264 
Thus, the Armendariz court articulated a workable standard 
for assessing bilaterality: an arbitration agreement is bilateral 
if it requires both contracting parties to arbitrate any claims 
arising out of "the same series of transactions or occur-
rences. "265 In other words, employers must agree to arbitrate 
claims arising out of the employment relationship which em-
ployees are required to arbitrate.266 
The Armendariz court also considered whether arbitration 
is an appropriate forum for resolving employees' workplace dis-
crimination claims.267 The threshold inquiry set forth by the 
U.S. Supreme Court asks whether the agreement to arbitrate a 
statutory claim requires employees to give up substantive 
rights afforded by the statute, as opposed to simply submitting 
"to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, fo-
rum. "268 Accordingly, the Armendariz court held that employ-
ment discrimination claims under FEHA are arbitrable, "if the 
arbitration permits an employee to vindicate his or her statu-
tory rights."269 For example, the Armendariz court refused to 
enforce the agreement at issue because it restricted employees' 
damage awards.270 The agreement limited the amount employ-
ees could recover to wages lost from the date of discharge to the 
date of the arbitration award.271 Under FEHA, however, em-
262 [d. at 120. 
263 [d. 
264 [d. (emphasis added). 
265 [d. 
266 [d. 
267 [d. at 10l. 
268 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985). 
269 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 90 (emphasis added). 
270 [d. at 103-104 (emphasis added). The arbitration agreement provides in part: 
"I and Employer . . . agree that in any such arbitration, my exclusive remedies for 
violation of the terms, conditions or covenants of employment shall be limited to a sum 
equal to the wages [ would have earned from the date of any discharge until the date of 
the arbitration award. [understand that [ shall not be entitled to any other remedy . .. 
including but not limited to reinstatement and/or injunctive relief" [d. at 92,103-104. 
271 [d. 
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ployees can sue for an amount up to $150,000 in damages.272 
Similarly, the arbitration agreement at issue in Armendariz 
precluded employees from seeking the remedy of reinstatement 
to their previous positions.273 Under FERA, by contrast, em-
ployees can ask a court to order their employer to reinstate 
them.274 
According to Armendariz, the California Supreme Court 
will not enforce arbitration provisions that compel employees to 
arbitrate statutory claims without providing for the full range 
of rights and remedies afforded by the applicable statute.275 To 
ensure that employees retain the rights they would enjoy if 
they brought their statutory claims in court, the Armendariz 
court endorsed five minimum requirements for the arbitration 
of such claims.276 An arbitration agreement that contemplates 
the arbitration of an employee's future Title VII and/or FEHA 
claims would have to guarantee to the employee the following 
safeguards: (1) A neutral arbitrator; (2) adequate discovery; (3) 
a written decision that will permit limited judicial review; (4) 
the availability of all types of relief otherwise available in 
court; and (5) limitations on the costs of arbitration that are· 
incurred by the employee.277 In addition to providing these 
272 CAL. Gov. CODE § 12970 (West Supp. 2004) ("(a) If the commission finds that a 
respondent has engaged in any unlawful practice under this part, it shall state its 
findings of fact and determination and shall issue and cause to be served on the parties 
an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the unlawful practice and to 
take action, including, but not limited to, any of the following: (3) The payment of ac-
tual damages as may be available in civil actions under this part, except as otherwise 
provided in this section. Actual damages include, but are not limited to, damages for 
emotional injuries if the accusation or amended accusation prays for those damages. 
Actual damages awarded under this section for emotional pain, suffering, inconven-
ience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses shall not 
exceed, in combination with the amounts of any administrative fines imposed pursuant 
to subdivision (c), one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) per aggrieved person 
per respondent.") (emphasis added). 
273 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 103-104 (emphasis added). See supra note 270. 
274 CAL. Gov. CODE § 12970 (a)(l)(West Supp. 2004) ("(a) If the commission finds 
that a respondent has engaged in any unlawful practice under this part, it shall state 
its findings of fact and determination and shall issue and cause to be served on the 
parties an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the unlawful prac-
tice and to take action, including, but not limited to, any of the following: (1) The hir-
ing, reinstatement, or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay."). 
275 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 103-104. 
276 [d. at 103 n.8 (limiting endorsement of the "Cole" factors to the context of 
mandatory employment arbitration agreements). 
277 [d. at 102 (quoting Cole v. Burns Intern. Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 
1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997». The "Cole" factors include: (1) Neutral arbitrator. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court previously held that a neutral arbitrator is essential to ensuring 
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safeguards, the terms of arbitration agreement must bind both 
employers and employees.278 
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR EVALUATING CLAIMS OF 
UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE FUTURE: A COMPARISON OF 
NINTH CIRCUIT AND CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT AP-
PROACHES 
Viewing Armendariz and the Ninth Circuit line of cases 
together, three essential concerns emerge.279 First, mandatory 
arbitration clauses in employment agreements are adhesion 
contracts that may be considered procedurally unconscionable 
when required as a prerequisite to employment.280 Second, an 
agreement to arbitrate must be bilateral, or equally binding as 
to claims brought by the employee and the employer.281 Third, 
the integrity of the arbitration process. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal.3d 807, 
825 (1981). (2) Adequate Discovery. The Armendariz court inferred that when parties 
agree to arbitrate statutory claims, they also implicitly agree to such discovery proce-
dures as are necessary to vindicate such claims, including access to essential docu-
ments and witnesses as determined by the arbitrator. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 106. 
The Armendariz court also noted that a limitation on discovery is one important com-
ponent of the simplicity and expedition of arbitration, and assigns the arbitrator the 
task of balancing simplicity with the requirements of the statutory claim. Id. at 106 
n.11. (3) A written decision that will permit limited judicial review. The Armendariz 
court held that an arbitrator in a FEHA case must issue a written decision revealing 
the findings and conclusions on which the arbitration award is based. Id. at 107. (4) 
The availability all relief available in court. An arbitration agreement must not limit 
statutorily imposed remedies, such as punitive damages and attorney fees. (5) Limita-
tions on costs of arbitration incurred by employees. The Armendariz court concluded 
that when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, it 
may not require employee to bear any type of expense that she would not be required to 
bear if she were free to bring claims in court. Id. at 113. The Armendariz court further 
held that a mandatory arbitration agreement that covers FEHA claims impliedly re-
quires the employer to pay all types of costs that are unique to arbitration. Id. 
278 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 120. 
279 These cases provide a good basis for comparison because the inquiry is the 
same under the CAA and the FAA. See supra note 232. 
280 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114-115 ("There is little dispute that [the 
arbitration agreement is adhesive]. It was imposed on employees as a condition of 
employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate."). See also, Circuit City v. 
Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) ("because Circuit City presented the arbitra-
tion agreement ... on an adhere or reject basis, we conclude that the agreement is 
procedurally unconscionable. "). 
281 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 120 ("an arbitration agreement imposed in 
an adhesive context lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting 
party, but not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or 
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences."). See also, Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174 
("unless the employer can demonstrate that the effect of a contract to arbitrate is bilat-
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terms that restrict or limit an employee's rights or remedies 
under civil rights statutes are substantively unconscionable.282 
These concerns are at the heart of the controversy surrounding 
the use of mandatory arbitration agreements in employment 
contracts-they need to be fair to the employees they are im-
posed upon. The following sections compare the approaches of 
the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme Court with re-
spect to these three concerns, and recommends the approaches 
that best protect employees' interests. 
A. AVOID ADHESION CONTRACTS To AVOID PROCEDURAL 
UNCONSCIONABILITY 
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Adams II will likely 
encourage more employers to implement mandatory arbitration 
programs.283 Nonetheless, the Armendariz court and the Ninth 
Circuit cases agree that it may be unfair to force prospective 
employees to choose between securing a job by signing an arbi-
tration agreement, or remaining unemployed but preserving 
their right to a judicial forum. 284 In California, both the federal 
and the state courts are likely to find procedural unconscion-
ability based solely on a showing that the arbitration agree-
ment is a prerequisite to employment.285 Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit held that merely offering employees a choice of whether 
or not to participate in the employer's arbitration program 
might not suffice to avoid a finding of procedural unconscion-
ability.286 Rather, employers must offer employees a meaning-
eral ... with respect to a particular employee, courts should presume such contracts 
substantively unconscionable."). 
282 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 121 ("The unconscionable one-sidedness of 
the arbitration agreement is compounded in this case by the fact that it does not per-
mit the full recovery of damages for employees, while placing no such restriction on the 
employer."). See also, Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175-1180 (finding terms several terms re-
stricting employees rights under applicable statutes to be substantively unconscion-
able). 
283 See, generally, King and Edmund, supra note 10 (stating that many employers 
are implementing mandatory arbitration programs in response to recent high-profile 
cases upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements). 
284 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4'" at 114-115; Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 
889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114-115); Ingle, 328 F.3d at 
1171 (citing Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893). 
285 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114-115; Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 
893 (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114-115); Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1171 (citing Circuit 
City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893). 
286 See Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1106-1107 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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ful opportunity to decline participation the arbitration pro-
gram.2B7 The employees' decisions must be absolutely free from 
employer pressure.2BB Because their approaches to this issue 
are similar, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the California Su-
preme Court offers a definitively superior solution to this re-
curring issue. 
The ultimate solution undoubtedly lies with Congress to 
enact legislation giving employees the right to accept or reject 
an agreement to arbitrate claims arising out of their employ-
ment.289 This may prove difficult, given the lack of support re-
ceived by bills introduced for this purpose at both the state and 
federal levels.290 Moreover, members of Congress resorted to 
lobbying the Ninth Circuit to uphold Duffield's preclusion of 
compelled arbitration of statutory employment discrimination 
claims.291 In a bizarre reversal of roles, fourteen members of 
the House of Representatives joined in filing a brief as amici 
curiae in support of their position.292 These members of Con-
gress appear to be asking the Ninth Circuit to accomplish by 
judicial decision what they have thus far been unable to ac-
complish through legislative amendments to the FAA. As a 
result, it is left to employers to correct the flaws that led em-
ployment arbitration agreements to the Ninth Circuit and the 
California Supreme court in the first place. 
Employers should stop making their arbitration agree-
ments mandatory, and start making them voluntary and desir-
287 [d. 
288 [d. 
289 See, e.g., H.R. 540, 10Sth Congo (2003) ("to amend [the Federal Arbitration Act), 
to allow employees the right to accept or reject the use of arbitration to resolve an 
employment controversy. "). 
290 See supra notes 150·152. 
291 See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003), 
for reference to Brief of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, George Miller, 
Barney Frank, Dennis J. Kucinich, John Conyers, Jr., Robert E. Andrews, William D. 
Delahunt, Harold E. Ford, Jr., Ron Kind, Edward J. Markey, Major R. Owens, Donald 
M. Payne, Hilda L. Solis, John F. Tierney, and Lynn L. Woolsey, in Support of the 
EEOC (Nos. 00·57222, 01-55321), EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 
F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (brief authored by David S. Schwartz and John M. True). 
292 See EEOC V. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) 
for reference to Brief of Members of the House of Representatives, George Miller, 
Barney Frank, Dennis J. Kucinich, John Conyers, Jr., Robert E. Andrews, William D. 
Delahunt, Harold E. Ford, Jr., Ron Kind, Edward J. Markey, Major R. Owens, Donald 
M. Payne, Hilda L. Solis, John F. Tierney, and Lynn L. Woolsey, in Support of the 
EEOC (Nos. 00-57222, 01-55321), EEOC V. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 
F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (brief authored by David S. Schwartz and John M. True). 
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able to employees. By eliminating the adhesive aspect of these 
agreements, employers will eliminate the concerns that arbi-
tration agreements oppress employees and favor employers. 
An employer who offers his employee the option of a voluntary 
arbitration program for the resolution of workplace claims re-
tains the ability to educate and encourage employees to take 
advantage of the benefits of such a program. Employers may 
wish to emphasize that employees often find it difficult to se-
cure an attorney to litigate their Title VII claims, which gener-
ate high litigation costs but produce comparatively small dam-
age awards.293 For this reason, the employer's arbitration pro-
gram may provide employees with the only feasible procedure 
for asserting their claims.294 Employers may further promote 
employee participation by incorporating into their arbitration 
agreements the other two crucial fairness concerns, (1) bilater-
ality, and (2) access to a full range of rights and remedies.295 
These steps will increase the probability that employees will 
voluntarily agree to submit future claims to arbitration, while 
reducing the risk of litigation over enforcement of those agree-
ments later on. 
B. ADOPT A WORKABLE STANDARD To PROVE BILATERALITY 
Adhesive arbitration agreements raise concerns that em-
ployers will insert terms that oppress employees while favoring 
employers.296 These concerns are especially warranted where 
the agreement requires employees to arbitrate claims against 
the employer, but does not require the employer to arbitrate 
claims against employees.297 In this situation, employees alone 
bear the effects of the disadvantages of arbitration, including 
293 See Marshall, supra note 93, at 96-97 (citing Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for 
Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agree-
ments, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Drsp. RESOLUTION 559, 563-570 (2001)). 
294 See id. at 97 (citing Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in 
the Debate Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON 
Drsp. RESOLUTION 559, 564 (2001)). 
295 See infra Parts III-B and III-C. 
296 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 115 ("Given the lack of choice and the po-
tential disadvantages that even a fair arbitration system can harbor for employees, we 
must be particularly attuned to claims that employers with superior bargaining power 
have imposed one-sided, substantively unconscionable terms as part of an arbitration 
agreement. "). 
297 [d. at 115-116. 
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limited discovery and reduced damages awards.298 Both Ar-
mendariz and the Ninth Circuit line of cases recognize that 
"the doctrine of unconscionability limits the extent which a 
stronger party may, through a contract of adhesion, impose the 
arbitration forum on the weaker party without accepting that 
forum for itself. "299 
The Armendariz court fielded criticism that is also prop-
erly directed at the Ninth Circuit's treatment of mandatory 
arbitration agreements. The FAA precludes courts assessing 
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement from construing 
the agreement in a manner different from the way non-
arbitration agreements are construed under state law.30o Con-
sequently, courts may not target elements that are unique to 
arbitration when assessing unconscionability in agreements 
governed by the FAA. 301 The Armendariz court denied that re-
quiring bilaterality in arbitration agreements singles out those 
agreements for disfavor in contravention of the FAA.302 
Rather, the court adopted the view that unconscionability may 
appear in forms peculiar to arbitration, citing as an example an 
agreement requiring arbitration of employee, but not employer 
claims.303 The Armendariz court stated, "it does not disfavor 
arbitration to hold that an employer may not impose a system 
of arbitration on an employee that seeks to maximize the ad-
vantages and minimize the disadvantages of arbitration for 
itself at the employee's expense."304 These arrangements are 
presumed unconscionable unless the employer offers some rea-
sonable justification for the lack ofbilaterality.305 
In Ingle, the Ninth Circuit apparently adopted this reason-
ing in holding that arbitration agreements in employment con-
tracts, at least when required as a condition of employment, 
raise a rebuttable presumption of substantive unconscionabil-
ity.306 The Ingle court specifically stated that its conclusion is 
298Id. at 116 (citing Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1537-1540 
(1997». 
299 Id. at 119. 
300 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
301Id. See also, Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 119 (citing Heily v. Superior Court, 202 
Cal. App. 3d 255, 260 (1988». 
302 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 119. 
303Id. 
304 Id. at 120. 
305Id. 
306 Circuit City v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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consistent with the federal policy promoting arbitration.307 In 
spite of this assurance, federal courts that apply California law 
within the Ninth Circuit will find themselves in an awkward 
position. The U.S. Supreme Court commands all courts to ad-
dress questions regarding the enforceability of mandatory arbi-
tration agreements in employment contracts with "a healthy 
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. "308 Yet Ninth 
Circuit precedent is also binding on lower federal courts within 
the circuit.309 Therefore, these courts are required to presume 
those same agreements substantively unconscionable under 
Ingle.310 
The tension between these competing positions is espe-
cially acute where an employee is required to sign an arbitra-
tion agreement before an employer will consider hiring him. 
Such agreements are sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court 
and federal law, yet are also susceptible to an easy finding of 
procedural unconscionability under California law as inter-
preted by the Ninth Circuit.3u Of course, courts must also fmd 
that the agreement contains terms that are substantively un-
conscionable before they refuse to enforce it. Employees, how-
ever, no longer bear the burden of proving substantive uncon-
scionability.312 Rather, employers must overcome the Ninth 
Circuit's presumption that such agreements are fatally one-
sided, even where the agreement purports to require arbitra-
tion of claims brought by both employees and employers.313 
Thus, federal courts governed by Ninth Circuit precedent need 
not overcome great hurdles to invalidate mandatory arbitration 
agreements that are a required condition of employment. In-
deed, if the Ninth Circuit approach is embraced, it seems likely 
307 Id. at 1174 n.10. 
308 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
309 See, generally, 32 AM. JUR. 20 Federal Courts § 604 (2003) (Absent some direc-
tion from the United States Supreme Court, binding precedent for the District Courts 
within a circuit is set by the Court of Appeals for that circuit). 
310 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174. 
311 See, generally, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) 
(holding valid an agreement, required as condition of employment, to arbitrate ADEA 
claims). 
312 See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F .3d at 1174. 
313 See, e.g., id. at 1175 ("even iflimitation to claims brought by employees were 
not explicit, an arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee ostensi-
bly binds to arbitration only employee-initiated claims."). See also, Circuit City v. 
Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003) (adopting language in Ingle). 
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to result in consistent judicial refusal to enforce these agree-
ments. This result is incongruous with the FAA's stated pur-
pose, "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitra-
tion agreements."3l4 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's presumption of substantive 
unconscionability is arguably inconsistent with the FAA for 
another reason. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA 
preempts state laws aimed at restricting the enforceability of 
arbitration provisions.315 Ingle's holding distinguishes arbitra-
tion agreements in employment contracts from all other con-
tracts by shifting to employers the burden of proving enforce-
ability.3l6 Employers must produce evidence both that the em-
ployee agreed to arbitration and that the arbitration agreement 
is bilateral, therefore enforceable.317 Employees are relieved of 
the burden of proving unconscionability until the employer 
proves bilaterality.31B The Ninth Circuit is not in direct conflict 
with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding because the uncon-
scionability defense under California law applies to all con-
tracts, not just arbitration agreements.319 Ingle's holding, how-
ever, applies exclusively to arbitration agreements in employ-
ment contracts.320 Under Ingle, the California doctrine of un-
conscionability operates in a manner aimed at restricting the 
enforceability of these types of arbitration agreements. Thus, 
Ingle's holding contravenes the FAA's policy of making arbitra-
tion agreements as enforceable as other contracts.321 
The FAA's policy of enforcing arbitration agreements is 
further eroded by the Ingle court's failure to explain how an 
employer might rebut the presumption that its arbitration 
agreement is unfairly one-sided. There remains some ambigu-
314 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. 
315 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9'" Cir. 2002) (quoting Doctor's 
Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). See also, Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.9 (1984). 
316 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174. 
317 See id. at 1175 ("even if limitation to claims brought by employees were not 
explicit, an arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee ostensibly 
binds to arbitration only employee-initiated claims."). See also, Mantor, 335 F.3d at 
1108 (adopting language in Ingle). 
318 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174 n.10. 
319 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985) (codifying the principle that a court 
can refuse to enforce an unconscionable clause or contract (with no specific mention of 
arbitration contracts)). 
320 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174. 
321 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n.12 (1967). 
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ity on this point. On one hand, the Ninth Circuit held in Lai 
that an employee may be compelled to arbitrate only claims she 
has knowingly agreed to arbitrate.322 Applying this standard, 
the court invalidated the agreement at issue in Lai on the 
ground that the employee did not knowingly agree to arbitrate 
her Title VII claim where the agreement did not specify the 
types of claims that would be subject to arbitration.323 On the 
other hand, the Ingle court rejected Circuit City's assertion 
that the arbitration agreement was mutually binding, partly 
because the agreement listed claims typically initiated by em-
ployees, not employers.324 Circuit City included the list to pro-
vide employees with examples of the types of claims covered by 
the agreement, as the Ninth Circuit previously required. 
The Ingle court specially pointed out that even if Circuit 
City were subjected to the same arbitration terms as employ-
ees, "the agreement is one-sided anyway" because there is only 
a remote possibility that Circuit City would initiate claims 
against lower-level employees.325 Employers must prove not 
only that the agreement on its face applies to employer-
initiated claims, but also that the effect of the arbitration 
agreement is biiateraV26 It will be difficult for employers to 
prove that the agreement is bilateral short of actually initiat-
ing a claim against an employee and submitting to arbitration 
for its resolution. Without a clear standard for meeting the 
Ninth Circuit's bilaterality requirement, neither the Ninth Cir-
cuit nor lower federal courts will consistently enforce arbitra-
tion agreements. 
In contrast, the California Supreme Court in Armendariz 
articulated a standard for assessing bilaterality that effectu-
ates the pro-arbitration purposes of the state and federal laws 
favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.327 The 
Armendariz court explained that an employer might establish 
the requisite "modicum of bilaterality" by plainly stipulating in 
322 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir.1994). 
323 Id. 
324 Ingle, 32B F.3d at 1174 n.B. 
325Id. 
326 Id. at 1174. 
327 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 120 ("an arbitration agreement imposed in an adhe-
sive context lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but 
not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence 
or series of transactions or occurrences."). 
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the terms of the agreement that employer and employee are 
equally bound to arbitrate disputes arising out of the employ-
ment relationship.328 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's elusive 
requirement that employers prove their arbitration agreements 
are bilateral in effect, a "healthy regard for the liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration"329 requires no more than a clear 
statement that the obligation to arbitrate is reciprocal. 
Requiring an affirmative, express stipulation that both 
parties are mutually bound to arbitrate claims covered by the 
agreement creates a workable standard to be applied by future 
courts. Moreover, the standard can be incorporated into exist-
ing employment arbitration programs and developed in future 
ones. Finally, as the employee considers whether to sign the 
agreement, she will be assured that at a minimum her em-
ployer is bound along with her. 
C. PROVIDE FOR FuLL VINDICATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS 
The third concern recognized by the Ninth Circuit and the 
Armendariz court focuses on whether the arbitration agree-
\ ment contains provisions that will prevent or impede employ-
ees in vindicating their rights under civil rights statutes, such 
as FEHA and Title VIV30 The approaches both courts employ 
to address this issue differ. The Ninth Circuit takes a "nega-
tive" or reactive approach, striking individual unconscionable 
terms from arbitration agreements as they reach the court un-
til the agreement as a whole is rendered unenforceable.33l In 
contrast, the Armendariz court takes a "positive" approach, 
adopting a series of affirmative minimum requirements that, 
328 Id. 
329 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
330 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 121 ("The unconscionable one-sidedness of 
the fu·bitration agreement is compounded in this case by the fact that it does not per-
mit the full recovery of damages for employees, while placing no such restriction on the 
employer."). See also, Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175-1180 (finding terms several terms re-
stricting employees rights under applicable statutes to be substantively unconscion-
able). 
331 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1109 (2003) (holding agree-
ment unenforceable in its entirety "because any earnest attempt to ameliorate the 
unconscionable aspects of Circuit City's arbitration would require this court to assume 
the role of contract author rather than interpreter."). 
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when met, help to ensure the fair arbitration of important 
statutory claims.332 
The Circuit City cases illustrate a problem with the Ninth 
Circuit's approach. In a series of unrelated decisions, the 
Ninth Circuit found that several terms of Circuit City's DRA 
deprived the employees of the full range of rights and remedies 
afforded by the applicable statutes.333 These terms were held 
substantively unconscionable.334 By now, Circuit City should be 
painfully aware of each invalid provision contained in its DRA. 
Yet, litigation continues over the amended terms of Circuit 
City's arbitration agreements.335 If Circuit City is unable, after 
many attempts, to draft an arbitration agreement that is ac-
ceptable to the Ninth Circuit, then it is surely a formidable 
task for other employers to do so. 
In this sense, Circuit City is representative of many em-
ployers who struggle to maintain enforceable compulsory arbi-
tration programs, or who are considering implementing one. 
The Circuit City plaintiffs are representative of many employ-
ees who elect employment and arbitration over unemployment. 
According to Ninth Circuit precedent, however, these plaintiffs 
remain secure in the knowledge that they may successfully 
challenge their executed arbitration agreements in court. The 
Ninth Circuit sends the message that employees should not, 
indeed cannot, rely on their employers' arbitration programs to 
fairly protect their interests. 
The Ninth Circuit's "negative" approach does not cure the 
root of the problem posed by the unfair restriction of employees' 
rights. The Ninth Circuit identifies unconscionable terms in 
arbitration agreements on a case-by-case basis. The court has 
discretion under California law to sever unconscionable terms 
in order to preserve and enforce the remainder of the agree-
ment.336 At some point, the number or scope of the offending 
332 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4'" at 102. 
333 For example, in Ingle, the Ninth Circuit held the following terms substantively 
unconscionable: (1) statute of limitations; (2) prohibition on class actions; (3) filing fee; 
(4) cost-splitting provisions; (5) limitation on remedies; and (6) Circuit City's power to 
unilaterally modify or terminate the arbitration agreement. Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1172-
1179. 
334 See id. 
335 See, e.g., Mantor, 335 F.3d at 1108. 
336 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985) ("if the court as a matter oflaw finds 
the contract or any clause ... unconscionable at the time it was made the court may 
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terms makes it impracticable to sever all of those terms, and 
the entire agreement is held unenforceable.337 Once the agree-
ment is invalidated, it is not clear that terms not specifically 
found unconscionable were instead affirmatively found accept-
able, or whether they were even considered by the court. Em-
ployers like Circuit City will eventually catch up with the 
court's "incremental rule changes," but they continue to run the 
risk that the court will invalidate their arbitration agreements 
based on alternative or amended terms.33S 
This approach leaves employers and employees with no 
basis to compare "good" terms with "bad" terms, and no way to 
save the overall agreement. For employers, the formula for 
drafting an enforceable arbitration agreement remains opaque. 
Prospective employees, in turn, have no reference to a frame-
work for a fair arbitration program to inform their decisions to 
accept or reject an employer's arbitration agreement. For these 
reasons, the Ninth Circuit's "negative" approach breeds litiga-
tion over the enforceability of arbitration agreements. This 
trend nullifies the advantages that parties attain by arbitrat-
ing rather than litigating a dispute, such as reducing costs and 
saving time. The Ninth Circuit's approach also contravenes 
the federal policy favoring arbitration by generating suspicion 
about the adequacy of arbitration procedures and denigrating 
arbitration as an effective method of dispute resolution. Fi-
nally, it leaves both employers and employees without an un-
derstanding of the requirements of a fair arbitration system. 
For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit should follow the Ar-
mendariz court in adopting an affirmative framework setting 
forth minimum requirements for the fair arbitration of statu-
tory rights. 339 Though the Ninth Circuit referred to these fac-
tors in Adams III, it has never affirmatively endorsed their 
consistent application.340 These requirements include: (1) a 
neutral arbitrator; (2) adequate discovery; (3) a written deci-
refuse to enforce the entire contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable clause .... "). 
337 See id. See also, Mantor, 335 F.3d at 1109 (holding agreement unenforceable 
in its entirety "because any earnest attempt to ameliorate the unconscionable aspects 
of Circuit City's arbitration would require this court to assume the role of contract 
author rather than interpreter."). 
338 See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 13l. 
339 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 100. 
340 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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sion that will permit limited judicial review; (4) the availability 
of all types of relief otherwise available in court; and (5) limita-
tions on the costs of arbitration that are incurred by the em-
ployee.341 By considering each requirement in turn, the court 
will effectively assess the overall fairness of the agreement be-
cause terms that fail to meet one or more of these requirements 
will be readily apparent. Patently unsatisfactory terms are 
more apt to be viewed as severable from the rest of the agree-
ment, assuming the employer made the effort to incorporate a 
majority of the other requirements. This approach promotes 
the federal policy favoring arbitration by resulting in the en-
forcement of more arbitration agreements. 
In addition to promoting the federal policy favoring arbi-
tration, adopting these basic requirements will protect the in-
terests of both employers and employees. Employers likely 
consider it advantageous to retain the ability to choose between 
litigation and arbitration when it comes to vindicating their 
own rights. 342 But as the Armendariz court noted, "a unilateral 
arbitration agreement imposed by the employer without rea-
sonable justification reflects the very mistrust of arbitration 
that has been repudiated by the United States Supreme 
Court."343 Whatever reasons an employer has for limiting the 
agreement to cover only employee claims clearly must yield if 
the employer desires to enforce the agreement. On one hand, 
by incorporating these five requirements, employers can guar-
antee for themselves the preservation of their rights in the ar-
bitration process. Thus, all employers forfeit is the unfair ad-
vantage they gain by retaining a choice of forums while limit-
ing employees to arbitration. On the other hand, employees 
will understand that by agreeing to arbitrate they are not los-
ing the benefits of a judicial forum. Rather, they are gaining 
the unique benefits offered by an arbitral forum. 
Arguably, placing these heightened restrictions on the 
manner of arbitration is consistent with the U.S. Supreme 
Court's oft-repeated assurance, "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a 
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an 
341 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 102. 
342 [d. at 120. 
343 [d. 
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arbitral, rather than judicial, forum. "344 By affirmatively adopt-
ing and enforcing these factors, the Ninth Circuit will establish 
a concise and consistent method of adjudging unconscionability 
claims. Employees will gain confidence in their employers' ar-
bitration systems, and will have a framework to assess the 
fairness and desirability of arbitrating their future claims. 
And employers will finally know what they need to do to estab-
lish and defend a valid arbitration program. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Arbitration holds benefits for employees, but prospective 
employees who are forced to sign arbitration agreements are 
not likely to appreciate these benefits, particularly if they sus-
pect they are giving up significant rights. Both the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the California Supreme Court recognize the potential 
unfairness these agreements pose to employees. The Ninth 
Circuit's approach to these agreements, however, tends to ex-
acerbate the perception that arbitration procedures adversely 
affect employees' rights. To remedy this problem, the Ninth 
Circuit should adopt certain aspects of the California Supreme 
Court's approach in Armendariz when assessing an employee's 
claim that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable. 
First, the Ninth Circuit should adopt the California Su-
preme Court's standard for assessing bilaterality, which re-
quires the arbitration agreement to clearly state that employ-
ers agree to arbitrate any claims that employees agree to arbi-
trate. Second, the Ninth Circuit should follow the Armendariz 
court, and adopt a framework of minimum requirements for the 
arbitration of important statutory claims to ensure that em-
ployees do not give up any rights or remedies afforded by the 
statute. By providing affirmative, workable standards for as-
sessing unconscionability, the Ninth Circuit will balance the 
preservation of employees' rights with a policy encouraging 
voluntary arbitration as an effective method of resolving em-
ployment disputes. 
The courts may only do so much to encourage employees to 
take advantage of the benefits of arbitration. Employers wish-
344 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985). See also, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (199\). 
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ing to maintain arbitration programs should seriously consider 
making employee participation in the programs strictly volun-
tary. Employers can encourage employee participation by mak-
ing it clear to employees that the agreement is bilateral, or 
equally binding on both employees and employers. Similarly, 
by incorporating into their arbitration programs the recom-
mended minimum requirements for fair arbitration of impor-
tant claims, employers will be able to educate potential em-
ployees about the implications of signing the arbitration 
agreement. This in tum will inspire employee confidence both 
in the employers' motives in presenting the agreement and in 
the employers' arbitration programs. 
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